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International  Law  and  State  Behavior:  Commitment  and  Compliance  in 
International  Monetary  Affairs 
BETH  A.  SIMMONS  University of  California,  Berkeley 
TW  hy do  sovereign governments make  international legal commitments, and  what effect does 
international law have on state behavior? Very little empirical research tries to answer these 
questions in a systematic  way. This article examines  patterns of commitment to and compliance 
with international monetary law. I consider the signal governments try to send by committing themselves 
through international legal commitments, and  I  argue that reputational concerns explain patterns of 
compliance. One of the most important  findings is that governments commit to and comply with legal 
obligations if other countries in their region do so.  Competitive market forces, rather than overt policy 
pressure from  the International Monetary Fund, are the most likely "enforcement"  mechanism. Legal 
commitment has an extremely  positive effect  on governments  that have recently  removed restrictive  policies, 
which indicates a desire to reestablish  a reputation  for compliance. 
International  relations  has  long  been  concerned 
with the role of rules in the organization of inter- 
national political life. Why do governments commit 
themselves  to  international  rules,  and  under  what 
conditions  do  they  comply with  their commitments? 
This is a pioneering area of research for international 
relations and legal scholars alike (Burley 1993; Chayes 
and Chayes 1995; Downs, Rocke,  and Barsoom 1996; 
Weiss  and Jacobson  1998; Young  1979). What is  at 
stake is whether and to what extent sovereign behavior 
can be  influenced by a legal commitment to  rules of 
conduct. This question, in turn, is at the root of major 
disagreements between realist and institutionalist the- 
orists  in  international  relations  (see  Keohane  and 
Martin 1995; Mearsheimer 1994-95). 
The  literature on  international rule compliance  is 
quite disparate in methods, theoretical orientation, and 
findings. Early quantitative work suggested that much 
international behavior is consistent with international 
law, even in the conduct of hostilities between  states 
(Kegley and Raymond 1981; Tillema and Van Wingen 
1982). It has been far more difficult to show a convinc- 
ing causal link between legal commitments and behav- 
ior,  however. Some  progress has  been  made  in  the 
examination of compliance with environmental agree- 
ments; in-depth case studies have demonstrated that 
technical "capacity"  is a necessary although not suffi- 
cient condition to secure compliance with agreements 
that  require technical  policy  implementation.  Weiss 
and Jacobson (1998) compare the performance of nine 
countries with respect  to  five environmental accords 
and conclude, among other things, that administrative 
and  technical  capacities  (including  knowledge  and 
training, adequate  authority and financial resources, 
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and  access  to  relevant  information)  are  crucial  to 
compliance (see also Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993). 
These arguments are less telling, however, where gov- 
ernments are obligated to  refrain from particular ac- 
tivities rather than implement  complex  technical  ac- 
cords. 
Others argue that the domestic regime type is essen- 
tial  to  understanding  international  law  compliance 
(Slaughter 1995). Governments based  on  the  rule of 
law and, especially, the  independence  of  the judicial 
branch are, in this view, much more likely to comply 
with international obligations than those that are not. 
Liberal democracies are likely to commit to rules that 
reflect  their  ideological  biases  and  to  comply  with 
them. This proposition has not been put to a rigorous 
test,  but  it  seems  to  dovetail with the  strand of  the 
democratic  peace  literature  that  argues  regard  for 
domestic  constitutional  constraints  carries over  into 
the  conduct  of  foreign  policy  (Dixon  1993;  Risse- 
Kappen 1995). 
The most serious challenge to any of these studies is 
that they are not able to show credibly that compliance 
is based  on  anything other  than immediate  state  or 
governmental  interests.  This  leaves  most  studies  on 
compliance subject to the criticism that rules add little 
to our understanding of international relations: They 
reflect rather than alter governments' interest in pur- 
suing a particular course of action (Downs and Rocke 
1995; Mearsheimer 1994-95). 
My argument is that international legal rules-do alter 
governments' interests in compliant behavior. Interna- 
tional legal commitment  is a bid to  make  a credible 
commitment to a particular policy stance. The accep- 
tance  of  treaty obligations  raises  expectations  about 
behavior that, once made, are reputationally costly for 
governments to violate. An international legal commit- 
ment  is one  way that governments  seek  to  raise the 
reputational costs of reneging, with important conse- 
quences for state behavior. I demonstrate this effect in 
the context of the public international law of money, an 
area in which governments traditionally have guarded 
jealously  their sovereign  decision-making status (Co- 
hen 1998). In 1945, for the first time in history a treaty 
regime was established governing money and the inter- 
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national payments system, to be  administered by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). This agreement 
required adherents to keep their current account free 
from restriction. Put most simply, if a bill comes  due 
for imports or for  an external interest  payment, na- 
tional monetary authorities should make  foreign  ex- 
change available to pay it. This obligation is assumed 
voluntarily, but  once  made  it  is  legally binding  and 
permanent. The IMF Articles of Agreement provide an 
opportunity to test whether a rule influences behavior, 
even  when  governments  face  unanticipated  circum- 
stances  that  make  compliance  inconvenient  or  even 
costly in the short run. 
The first section provides an overview of the substan- 
tive  monetary rules under consideration  and formu- 
lates  expectations  for  commitment  and  compliance. 
The  second  section  presents  data  to  address  three 
questions. Why do governments commit themselves to 
these  rules? Under what conditions do they comply? 
Does  commitment to an international rule affect gov- 
ernment behavior? The final section explores the find- 
ings, provides interpretations, and draws conclusions. 
The  evidence  suggests that legal  commitments  are 
crucial to policy choice. Taken as a whole, the findings 
are most consistent with an interpretation that govern- 
ments make commitments to further their interests and 
comply  with  them  to  preserve  their  reputation  for 
predictable  behavior  in  the  protection  of  property 
rights. Strong regional effects suggest that reputations 
develop  around  regional  standards  of  behavior.  A 
positive reputation for respecting the rule of law do- 
mestically  is  associated  with  compliance,  which  sug- 
gests  that whenever  possible  governments will  avoid 
damaging a valuable reputation for law-governed be- 
havior; this consideration deters them from breaking 
the law in the international sphere. The influence of a 
formal legal obligation is especially strong in the first 
few years after a period of restrictions, which is con- 
sistent with the desire of legally committed countries to 
reestablish their credibility for openness. The implica- 
tion  is that despite  the  formal ability of  the  IMF to 
enforce  the  rules,  it  is  likely to  be  the  market that 
"enforces" the public international law of money. The 
broader message for theorists of international relations 
is that enforcement need not be overt and centralized 
to give behavioral rules their bite. 
MARKETS AND INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY LAW: EXPECTATIONS 
REGARDING COMMITMENT  AND 
COMPLIANCE 
The IMF's Articles of Agreement are the first interna- 
tional accord in history to obligate signatories to par- 
ticular standards of  monetary  conduct.  Article  VIII 
spells  out  the  general  obligations  of  members,  and 
Section 2 rules prohibit restrictions on the making of 
payments and transfers for current international trans- 
actions.1 The purpose is to do what international trade 
1 Current  transactions  include  payment  for  goods,  services,  and 
"invisibles"-insurance  charges,  warehousing  charges,  shipping, 
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law had been doing for decades: provide a framework 
that  facilitates  the  exchange  of  goods,  services,  and 
capital among countries.2 
Governments  may  not  wish  to  maintain  an  open 
current account for two main reasons. One may be to 
support  developmental  objectives  that  favor  certain 
kinds  of  transactions  (exports,  capital  inflows)  over 
others (imports, capital outflows) based on established 
state priorities. The  other may be  to  ameliorate bal- 
ance-of-payments  problems  (Edwards  1985,  381-2). 
Under  these  conditions, governments usually want to 
retain the flexibility of intervening to conserve foreign 
exchange in whatever ways they consider appropriate. 
The IMF has always viewed such systems of control 
as dangerous substitutes for economic adjustment and 
as inhibitors to  the  development  of  free  foreign  ex- 
change markets. But because many of the IMF's found- 
ing members could not immediately achieve full con- 
vertibility,  Article  VIII  obligations  are  voluntarily. 
Upon joining the fund, new members can avail them- 
selves of transitional arrangements under Article XIV, 
which effectively grandfather restrictions in place upon 
their accession.3 Yet, the articles do not specify either 
a  time  limit  on  the  transitional period  or  a  set  of 
criteria for ending it (De  Vries and Horsefield  1969, 
225). The IMF encourages countries it believes are in a 
position to do so to make an Article VIII commitment, 
but there are no direct positive or negative incentives. 
Furthermore,  the  IMF  does  not  directly  enforce 
obligations, although it publishes data on states' poli- 
cies  from which  one  can  infer  compliance  (see  the 
Appendix). The Executive Board can approve restric- 
tions (or not), and this role may be quite important in 
ensuring  a  degree  of  transparency in  distinguishing 
policies  consistent  with  a  contingent  rule  from  the 
exercise  of  sheer  policy  discretion.  Technically,  the 
Executive Board can declare  a member ineligible  to 
use the resources of the fund if it "fails to fulfill any of 
its obligations" under the articles,4 and noncompliance 
sometimes  interrupts  drawings  under  stand-by  and 
extended  arrangements.5 The  IMF  has  used  these 
formal remedies  very sparingly. Noncompliers  rarely 
business and tourist travel, family remittances, royalties, dividends, 
interest,  and  other  noncapital  transactions. The  articles explicitly 
permit the regulation of international capital movements (Article VI, 
section 3). 
2 Article  IV,  section  1. The  original  White  Plan  advocated  "the 
general policy of foreign exchange trading in open,  free  and legal 
markets, and the  abandonment as rapidly as conditions  permit of 
restrictions on exchange controls" (Horsefield and deVries 1969, 64). 
3Article  XIV, section 2. An Article XIV country also can adapt its 
restrictions  without  the  need  for  IMF  approval,  but  it  cannot 
introduce new restrictions without approval; cannot adapt multiple 
currency practices without  approval; and cannot  maintain restric- 
tions  that the  member cannot justify as necessary for balance-of- 
payments reasons (see Horsefield 1969, 248-59). 
4Article  XV,  section 2(a). 
5According  to Gold (1988, 466): "All standby arrangements include 
a  uniform term  on  measures  that  directly or  indirectly affect ex- 
change rates. Under this term a member is precluded from making 
purchases under an arrangement if at any time during the period of 
the arrangement  the member:  '(i) imposes [or intensifies]  restrictions  on 
payments and transfers for current international transactions; or (ii) 
introduces  [or modifies]  multiple  currency practices; or  (iii)  con- 
cludes  bilateral payments agreements  which  are inconsistent  with American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 4 
have to worry about direct retaliation, since members 
that vote  for some  kind of  punishment may be  con- 
cerned about similar treatment in the future. The fund 
is  much  more  likely  to  try persuasion  than  apply a 
remedy  for  continued  noncompliance  (Gold  1979, 
185). 
My analysis focuses on enforcement that flows from 
market rather than official sources (Greif 1992, 1993; 
Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast 1994; Milgrom, North, 
and Weingast  1990). The  literature on time-inconsis- 
tent policy stresses private actors' broadly held belief 
that a government's optimal ex post policy may differ 
from its optimal ex ante strategy (Barro and Gordon 
1983; Canzoneri  and Henderson  1991; Kydland and 
Prescott 1977; Staigler and Tabellini 1987). In the case 
of time-inconsistent policies with fixed preferences, it is 
difficult for a government to  commit to  refrain from 
altering policy  in  the  future.  Alternatively,  one  can 
understand a  commitment  to  Article  VIII  as  an  at- 
tempt  by  governments  to  signal  their  future  policy 
stance under conditions of incomplete information. In 
this case, resolving the credibility problem requires the 
government  to  be  able  to  signal its  "true type." Of 
course,  such  a  signal  is  only  meaningful  if  it  helps 
private actors separate true liberalizers from govern- 
ments that are more committed to other goals, such as 
redistribution. The key is for the true reformer to be 
able to send a signal that distinguishes it from a less 
committed type (Persson 1988; Persson and Tabellini 
1989; Spence 1974). Rodrik (1989) emphasizes that in 
order to send a credible signal of true intentions in an 
incomplete  information  environment,  a  government 
may have to send a stronger signal than it would in the 
absence of a credibility problem. 
My argument is that Article VIII commitment is one 
way in which governments may seek to enhance their 
credibility to markets that doubt their ability or will- 
ingness to maintain current account policy liberaliza- 
tion into the future. Governments that are interested in 
efficiency gains  from  international transactions have 
good reasons to establish their credibility through such 
a commitment. True, there are alternative mechanisms 
(Rowlands 1993), but few provide as clear a signal or as 
potentially  binding  a  constraint  as  an  Article  VIII 
commitment. For governments whose  credibility suf- 
fers from a basic problem of time inconsistency, Article 
VIII triggers more stringent scrutiny than would be the 
case with a simple policy pronouncement. 
Whatever the source of government credibility, Ar- 
ticle  VIII  raises the  costs  of  policy reversal in three 
ways. (1)  It focuses  expectations  on  a clear codified 
standard, the exact meaning of which has been author- 
itatively  interpreted  by  the  Executive  Board  of  the 
IMF.  (2)  It  provides  transparency through  regular 
consultations with the fund staff. (3) It mobilizes a new 
set of external actors (private economic, governmental, 
and  legal)  who  may  exert pressure  to  comply  on  a 
government  that  is  considering  or  engaging  in  rule 
violation. Indeed, as Lipson (1991) argues, treaties are 
Article  VIII; or (iv) imposes  [or intensifies] import restrictions for 
balance of payments reasons.'" 
designed,  by  long-standing  convention,  to  raise  the 
credibility of promises by staking national reputation 
on  adherence  to  them  (see  also  Abbott  and  Snidal 
2000).  The  potential  for  incurring costs  can be  very 
helpful in making a credible commitment in the first 
place (Martin 1993). 
This is not to suggest that Article VIII is a straight- 
jacket on governmental policy choice, but few interna- 
tional commitments are. In a time-inconsistency frame- 
work, contingent rules allow for temporary departures 
under well-understood circumstances (Bordo and Ky- 
dland 1995; Bordo and Rockoff 1996). Recent innova- 
tions in signaling models explore the conditions under 
which reneging on a pledge need not harm reputation: 
If it occurs under circumstances that are known to be 
especially adverse, then this action will not reveal how 
a particular government will behave  in more  normal 
times. Rule violation, in extreme cases, is therefore not 
informative for  purposes  of  developing  a  reputation 
(Drazen  1997). Review by the  IMF Executive Board 
regarding temporary approval of restrictions that vio- 
late  Article  VIII  obligations  provides  the  flexibility 
recently incorporated into reputational models. 
The literature gives relatively little attention to the 
problem of establishing credibility in an international 
setting when there is competition among jurisdictions. 
An emerging empirical stream suggests, however, that 
countries with poor protection for investors, measured 
by both the character of legal rules and the quality of 
law enforcement, tend to have small and narrow capital 
markets (La Porta et al. 1997) as well as more limited 
and costly access to  the  pool  of  international capital 
(Sobel  1999).  Studies  also  have  established  the  link 
between corruption and other national risks and trends 
in foreign investment  (Ramcharran 1999; Wei  2000). 
Investors and traders can  choose  among  a  range of 
business  venues,  and  they  prefer  to  do  business  in 
venues characterized by a national commitment to the 
protection of property rights. Therefore, governments 
compete  for  international  business  through  various 
reputational devices  (see,  e.g.,  Maxfield 1997) in the 
same way that they are forced to compete  in a broad 
range of regulatory areas when factors of production 
are mobile (Aman 1995; Cerny 1994; Oberhansli 1997; 
Sinn 1999; Tiebout 1956). 
The  first expectation  is  policy  convergence,  espe- 
cially among countries whose venues  are near substi- 
tutes  for  one  another.  Governments  that  lag  signifi- 
cantly  the  policies  of  their  more  credibly  liberal 
competitors place their business sector at a competitive 
disadvantage. Yet, economic agents are likely to toler- 
ate  noncompliance  if  it  is  rampant  among  similar 
states. There are two reasons for this, and both relate 
to the consequences of noncompliance. First, to renege 
when everyone else does is likely to be interpreted as a 
situation sufficiently dire to justify the contingency of 
the rule. In a signaling framework, noncompliance  in 
the  context of  generalized violation  may not provide 
clear information on  a country's future policy inten- 
tions.  Second,  investors and traders incur high costs 
(and  run into  collective  action problems)  if  they  at- 
tempt to punish numerous violators. Noncompliance is 
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much less costly for a particular government if many 
others  are  also  in  violation.  Thus,  the  decision  to 
liberalize the foreign exchange market is strongly in- 
fluenced by the policies adopted by international com- 
petitors. 
The second expectation is that a reputation for the 
rule of law correlates with compliance. One implication 
of viewing market pressures as the  primary enforce- 
ment  mechanism for  international monetary rules  is 
that a government should be very concerned to develop 
a reputation for openness and especially predictability. 
Moreover, governments that have invested in and rest 
on  a stable legal framework at home  are unlikely to 
jeopardize  this reputation by lightly flouting interna- 
tional  legal  obligations.  Governments  that  regularly 
ignore property rights do not have much reputation to 
lose.  Similarly, after a period of noncompliance,  gov- 
ernments committed to Article VIII have an incentive 
to  reestablish their credibility swiftly by returning to 
predictable, open behavior as soon and as convincingly 
as possible. In short, a public legal commitment to the 
international  community raises  expectations  and  en- 
courages  compliance,  even  under  difficult  circum- 
stances.  Compliance  is  enhanced  by  a  decentralized 
system in which competition  and concern for reputa- 
tion motivate behavior. 
COMMITMENT, COMPLIANCE, AND THE 
EFFECT OF RULES: FINDINGS 
Why Commit  to  Article  Vil? 
If  the  reasoning  outlined  above  is  correct, then  the 
decision to commit to Article VIII should be strongly 
influenced by markets that value certainty and policy 
liberalism. Therefore, the choices of economic compet- 
itors should be  important factors. Two variables are 
used  here  to  test  this  proposition.  The  first  is  the 
proportion of IMF members committed to Article VIII 
(see the Appendix for all definitions and sources), and 
the  second  is the proportion of jurisdictions within a 
given region that have made such a commitment. The 
hypothesis is that as the latter proportion increases, so 
does  the  likelihood  that  any  given  country  in  that 
region will make such a commitment. 
A serious test requires a battery of economic, insti- 
tutional, and domestic  political  controls to  minimize 
the possibility that any regional correlation is spurious. 
Downs and Rocke (1995) argue persuasively that com- 
mitments are endogenous to expectations about future 
compliance. Because countries with an economy that is 
vulnerable to sharp swings are likely to find it difficult 
to comply, susceptibility to balance-of-payments pres- 
sure is expected to  make a government less likely to 
accept Article VIII obligations in the first place. De- 
velopmental  level  and  the  direction  of  the  business 
cycle also may influence the decision to make a legal 
commitment with respect to  economic  policy. There- 
fore, the following analysis controls for gold and for- 
eign  exchange  reserves  as  a  proportion  of  GDP  (Re- 
servwes/GDP),  volatility  in  this  proportion  (Reserve 
Volatility), GDP per Capita, and GDP Growth. 
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A  second set of controls addresses the institutional 
context. Two of these relate to the IMF's potential role. 
First, the fund may have policy leverage through the 
distribution of  its resources. If it applies leverage to 
commit to liberalization, then the use of IMF credits 
should  be  associated  with  a  greater  propensity  to 
commit to Article VIII. Second, the fund changed its 
surveillance policy in 1977 in ways that may affect the 
decision to commit. Previously, governments willing to 
announce acceptance of Article VIII obligations could 
avoid  multilateral  surveillance  (Gold  1983;  474_5).6 
Article  XIV  countries,  in  contrast,  were  subject  to 
wide-ranging and even invasive "consultations," during 
which the IMF staff broadly reviewed and the Execu- 
tive Board passed judgment on the member's balance- 
of-payments position.  Therefore,  the  acceptance  rate 
should  be  higher,  ceteris  paribus, before  1977  than 
after. The third control in this set relates to the varying 
degree of flexibility in exchange rates among countries. 
Flexible rates absorb some of the balance-of-payments 
adjustment burden  and  mitigate  the  need  for  large 
reserves to defend the currency. At  any given reserve 
level, greater exchange rate flexibility should be asso- 
ciated with a higher propensity to commit. 
Domestic  political conditions are another likely in- 
fluence on the decision to commit to Article VIII. Most 
obviously, a  government  may choose  liberal policies 
because that is what the polity demands. Article VIII 
provides  a  right  of  access  to  foreign  exchange  for 
residents and nonresidents, which is a valuable guar- 
antee  to  the  traded  goods  sector.  For  importers, it 
signals  to  foreign  firms that  the  government  is  not 
likely to interfere in the foreign exchange market or to 
intervene arbitrarily in international business transac- 
tions.7 This provision is  also  likely to  be  favored by 
export groups, who are concerned with issues of reci- 
procity and retaliation (Gilligan  1997). Trade depen- 
dence  should  positively  influence  the  legal  commit- 
ment  to  free  and  open  foreign  exchange  markets. 
Finally, one mightfexpect that civil society's demand for 
guaranteed foreign exchange access is most likely to be 
addressed by a democratic regime. In political terms, 
private interests are likely to oppose  the state, which 
stands to garner concentrated rents as the dispenser of 
limited access to hard currency. If so, then democratic 
governance  should  contribute  to  a  higher  rate  of 
Article VIII acceptance. 
Before  proceeding,  a  graphic presentation  of  the 
data is useful. Figure 1 shows that membership in the 
IMF has grown considerably over the  past three  de- 
cades, as has the proportion of countries committed to 
Article VIII. By 1995 a clear majority of members had 
abandoned transitional status and obligated themselves 
to openness. 
6  Consultations with Article VIII countries were established in 1960 
but  were  completely  voluntary  (de  Vries  and  Horsefield  1969, 
246-7). 
7 According to de Vries and Horsefield (1969, 285-6),  for example, 
"Article VIII status had come to signify over the years either that a 
country had a sound international balance of payments position, or 
that if its payments position was threatened, it would avoid the use of 
exchange restrictions." American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 4 
FIGURE 1.  Growth  in Membership  in the  International  Monetary  Fund,  1967-97 
U Article VIII  countries  1X  Article XIV countries 
182  (committed)  (transitional)  .. 
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Years 
For  many  countries,  the  transitional  period  was 
lengthy,  as  indicated  by  the  Kaplan-Meier  "survival 
function" in Figure 2, which uses yearly observations 
for  153 countries who were  members by  1995.8 The 
Kaplan-Meier function estimates about a 25% chance 
of accepting Article VIII status in the first five years of 
IMF membership, a 50% chance within 31 years, and 
about  a  75%  chance  after  40  years.  Clearly, many 
countries have not rushed to make a legal commitment 
to keep the current account free from restrictions. 
What factors  affect the  rate  of  acceptance  of  the 
obligations  under  Article  VIII?  Note  that  this  is  a 
unidirectional decision: Once  made,  it cannot be  re- 
scinded, although a country can fail to comply with its 
commitment  (discussed  below).  I  use  techniques  of 
survival analysis that focus on the spell of time until the 
event of interest occurs (in this case, an Article VIII 
commitment).  A  hazard model  is appropriate in this 
case  because  it captures the  accumulation of  "risks" 
over time that affect the decision to commit.9 Specifi- 
cally, I  employ  a Cox proportional hazard model  to 
8  The literature usually terms the event of interest a "failure"  and the 
time  elapsed  until  its  occurrence  as  "survival," regardless  of  the 
substantive problem modeled. Proponents of international openness 
and  free  markets  would  view  "survival" analysis  as  "transition" 
analysis and an Article VIII commitment as a "success"; those who 
favor closer government management of markets might consider the 
customary appellations more apt. 
9 The hazard model is more general than a panel probit because  it 
allows the  underlying probability of committing to Article VIII  to 
change each year. In addition, the structure of the data (all Os  and a 
single  switch to  1 at the  point  of  each  country's commitment)  is 
examine  the  effects  of  a  number of  continuous  and 
categorical predictors; because some of these vary over 
time, the tests presented here use time-varying covari- 
ates.  The  Cox  model  estimates  a  "hazard rate" for 
Article VIII acceptance at a particular moment,10 and 
this hazard rate is modeled as a function of the baseline 
hazard (ho) at time t, which is simply the hazard for an 
observation with all explanatory variables set to zero,1" 
as  well  as  a  numffber  of  explanatory  variables,  the 
estimates of which indicate proportional changes rela- 
tive to this baseline hazard. 
Table 1 presents the findings of the Cox proportional 
hazard estimation  for  the  variables discussed  above. 
(Note that a ratio of more than 1 indicates an increase 
in the rate of Article VIII acceptance, and a ratio of 
less than 1 indicates a reduction in the rate of accep- 
tance.) Model 1 is a reduced form version that includes 
only relevant variables for which a very strong case can 
be made that they are exogenous  to the commitment 
decision.  Models  2-4  present the  effects of variables 
that are arguably endogenous  to some degree, as well 
as  other  exogenous  variables  for  which  one  cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of no effect on the baseline 
analogous to "death" in the epidemiological  studies in which such 
models are frequently employed. 
10 The hazard rate is defined as: 
h(t)  probability of accepting Art. VIII between times t and t +  1 
(probability of accepting Art. VIII after time t) 
11 In this case, I have set all variables to their minimum value in order 
to avoid interpretations based on deviations from unobserved values 
of the explanatory variables. 
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FIGURE 2.  The  Kaplan-Meier  Survival  Function  Duration  of Article  XIV Status  over  Time 
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hazard rate. Data availability causes the sample size to 
change  somewhat,  but  none  of  the  conclusions  dis- 
cussed below  are altered substantially by analyzing a 
common sample. 
The  first two  variables,  Universality and  Regional 
Norm, test the proposition that taking on an obligation 
is likely to be related to similar actions by others. Both 
of  these  have  a  large  and positive  influence  on  the 
acceptance  rate. According to  model  2, for example, 
every increase of one percentage point in the propor- 
tion  of  IMF  members  who  accept  Article  VIII  in- 
creases by 5.5% the likelihood of acceptance by other 
members. A similar increase in the regional proportion 
of Article VIII adherents increases a country's likeli- 
hood  of  acceptance  by 2.7%. This translates into  an 
increase  of  31% in the  rate of  acceptance  for  every 
increase of 10% in regional accession.12  Clearly, as the 
number of  countries who  adhere to  Article  VIII  in- 
creases, there is a much greater chance that an uncom- 
mitted government will do so. Note  that this effect is 
significant even  when  controlling  for  time  (Year in 
model 4), which reduces the likelihood that the univer- 
sality and regional norms variables simply reflect  an 
increase in adherents over time. 
There  is also  evidence  that institutional incentives 
make  some  difference  in  Article  VIII  acceptance. 
Surveillance (a  dummy variable with  the  value  of  0 
before  1977,  1 thereafter)  has the  expected  negative 
12  This is calculated by raising the estimated hazard ratio to the tenth 
power. 
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effect, although it is not robustly statistically significant 
for this sample of countries, many of which joined the 
IMF after surveillance became mandatory for all mem- 
bers.13 Moreover, the coefficient is significantly weak- 
ened by including year as an explanatory variable. This 
is understandable, since surveillance is a dichotomous 
dummy that distinguishes years before and after 1977. 
Flexible  exchange. rates probably increase  the  likeli- 
hood  of  making an Article  VIII  commitment,  since 
these  minimize the foreign exchange reserves needed 
to  defend  a beleaguered  currency, but the  statistical 
significance varies with the model specification. 
Perhaps  most  interesting  is  the  fairly strong  and 
consistent negative effect of the use of fund credits on 
the Article VIII decision. This provides evidence that 
the IMF is not effectively using resources as leverage to 
pressure borrowers into making a legal commitment.14 
In fact, Use of Fund Credits reduces the proportional 
13  For countries that had joined  the IMF by 1980, earlier research 
shows that the change in the surveillance regime had a very strong 
negative  effect  on  the  decision  to  commit  to  Article  VIII,  which 
indicates a rather perverse incentive to commit. Mandatory surveil- 
lance for all countries drastically reduced the probability of accepting 
Article  VIII  by  countries  that were  members  during the  regime 
change (Simmons 2000). 
14  This finding is consistent  with archival research, which suggests 
that  the  IMF  is  more  likely  to  recommend  that  a  country delay 
commitment to Article VIII when its balance of payments is under 
pressure (Simmons 2000). The reason is that such a commitment not 
only would lack credibility but also would allow the "leakage" of IMF 
resources to pay private creditors rather than to buy time  for the 
government to make fundamental economic policy adjustments. American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 4 
TABLE 1.  Influences  on the  Rate  of Article  VIII  Acceptance 
Explanatory  Variable  Reduced form Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Universality  1.066*  1.055*  1.247*  1.040 
(.010)  (.011)  (.089)  (.024) 
Regional  Norm  1.029*  1.027*  1.038*  1.028* 
(.005)  (.005)  (.010)  (.005) 
Use of Fund  Credits  .534*  .577*  .548* 
(.160)  (.241)  (.169) 
Flexible  Exchange Rate  1.52  2.659*  1.512 
(.418)  (1.286)  (.409) 
Surveillance  0.46*  .407 
(.053)  (.295) 
Openness (Trade  Dependence)  1.008*  1.009*  1.019*  1.009* 
(.002)  (.003)  (.004)  (.179) 
Democracy  1.028 
(.034) 
GNP/Capita  1.00007*  1.00007*  1.00009*  1.00007 
(.00002)  (.00003)  (.00004)  (.00003) 
GDP Growth  1.033  1.035  1.021  1.036 
(.020)  (.021)  (.041)  (.022) 
Reserves/GDP  1.740  .950  1.744 
(.493)  (1.192)  (.505) 
Reserve Volatility  .770  .883  .753 
(.157)  (.300)  (.155) 
Year  1.052 
(.051) 
No. of countries  133  128  106  128 
No. of acceptances  77  72  36  72 
Time  "at risk"  2,462.99  2,375.95  2,177.96  2,375.95 
Log-likelihood  -228.089  -200.354  - 88.305  -199.51 
x2  163.58  165.36  80.20  163.61 
p  >X2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Note:  Results  of  a  Cox  proportionate  hazard  model  with  time  varying  covariates;  hazard  ratios  (robust  standard  errors).  *p  Izi  -  <.05. 
hazard rate by about 44% (model  1), which is consis- 
tent with an argument that links fund assistance with 
problems of moral hazard. This result makes sense in 
light  of  the  signaling literature, which  suggests  that 
contingent  aid  makes  it  much  more  difficult for  a 
government to signal its true intent about future policy 
to  the  market (Rodrik  1989). Because  such a signal 
would be difficult to interpret, there is little reason for 
a borrowing government to send it. 
Domestic  political  demands  that  flow  from  trade 
openness  also  have  an  important  influence  on  the 
acceptance rate. Openness  to  the  international trade 
system raises the proportional hazard rate significantly. 
According to model  1, every increase of one  point in 
imports plus exports as a proportion of GDP increases 
by .8% the likelihood of Article VIII acceptance. This 
can  account  for  a  difference  of  26%  in  acceptance 
probability for countries with trade profiles as different 
as, say, Malaysia (where imports plus exports approxi- 
mate 80% of GDP for the period under consideration) 
and the Philippines (where the corresponding ratio is a 
little more than 50%).15  The presence of a democratic 
regime has no independent effect on the propensity to 
commit to openness  (model 3). 
Finally, the economic controls basically fulfill expec- 
tations,  although  most  fall  short  of  traditional stan- 
dards  of  statistical  significance.  A  commitment  to 
external liberalization is more likely under good  and 
improving economic  conditions.  High  per-capita  in- 
come, high GDP growth, and strong reserves of foreign 
exchange  are  likely  to  influence  a  government  to 
commit  (the  latter  two  with  a  probability of  <.10). 
Reserve volatility, although not statistically significant 
at  traditional  levels,  is  correctly  signed.16 What  is 
15 This is calculated by raising the estimated hazard ratio to the 29th 
power. 
16  Current account balance and volatility as well  as terms of trade 
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TABLE 2.  Rates  and  Years  of  Noncompliance  Due  to  Restrictions  on  Current Account,  by 
Country,  1967-97 
Rate of Noncompliance  Years Committed 
Country  (1967-97)  (1967-97)  Dates of Restrictions 
Dominican Republic  1.00  31  1967-97 
El Salvador  .87  31  1967-93 
Jamaica  .81  31  1968-69,1973-95 
Guyana  .77  31  1967,1971-93 
Chile  .75  20  1983-95,1996-97 
South Africa  .71  24  1979-93,  1996-97 
Cyprus  .71  7  1991-93,  1996-97 
Iceland  .64  14  1984-92 
Morocco  .60  5  1993,1996-97 
Argentina  .59  29  1972-77,  1983-93 
Costa Rica  .55  31  1972-73,  1975, 1982-95 
Peru  .55  31  1971-78,  1985-92,  1996 
St. Lucia  .53  15  1981-86,1996-97 
Guatemala  .52  31  1967-73,  1981-89 
St. Vincent  .50  14  1982-86,  1996-97 
Barbados  .50  4  1996-97 
Israel  .50  4  1996-97 
Nicaragua  .48  31  1979-93 
Ecuador  .41  27  1983-93 
Greece  .40  5  1996-97 
Tunisia  .40  5  1996-97 
Honduras  .39  31  1982-93 
Fiji  .28  25  1989-92,1996-97 
Italy  .26  31  1975-82 
Swaziland  .25  8  1996-97 
Turkey  .25  8  1996-97 
Grenada  .25  4  1997 
Austria  .23  31  1967-73 
Bolivia  .23  30  1982-86,1996-97 
Korea  .22  9  1996-97 
Belize  .21  14  1982, 1996-97 
St. Kitts and Nevis  .18  11  1996-97 
Mexico  .16  31  1983-87 
United Kingdom  .16  31  1967-71 
Antigua and Barbuda  .14  14  1996-97 
France  .13  31  1969-71,  1983 
Haiti  .13  31  1968-71 
Dominica  .11  18  1996-97 
Japan  .10  30  1968-70 
Oman  .09  23  1996-97 
Papua New Guinea  .09  22  1996-97 
Bahamas  .08  24  1996-97 
Netherlands Antilles  .06  31  1996-97 
Solomon Islands  .06  18  1997 
Singapore  .05  21  1997 
Note: Noncompliers  with  three  or fewer  years of Article  VIII  commitment  (1995-97)  are:  Algeria,  Bangladesh,  Benin,  Botswana,  Burkina-Faso,  Cameroon, 
Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  China,  Comoro,  Congo, Croatia,  Czechoslovakia,  Gabon,  Georgia,  Ghana,  Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau,  India,  Ivory  Coast, 
Jordan,  Kazakhstan,  Kenya,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,  Malta,  Moldova,  Namibia,  Nepal,  Niger,  Pakistan,  Paraguay,  Philippines,  Poland,  Senegal, Sierra 
LLeone,  Slovak Republic,  Slovenia,  Sri Lanka,  Tanzania,  Togo, Tonga, Ukraine,  Western  Samoa, and Zimbabwe.l 
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TABLE 3.  Influences  on the  Decision  to  Comply  with  Article  VIII  Obligations 
Model 4 
Explanatory  Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Coef.  Aprob. 
Constant  - 1.907*  -2.173*  -3.154*  -2.09* 
(8.56)  (.984)  (1.038)  (.898) 
Regional  Noncompliance  6.409*  5.973*  6.427*  5.90*  .62 
(.996)  (1.002)  (1.145)  (.966) 
Rule of Law  -.535*  -.572*  -.593*  -.569*  -.45 
(.137)  (.148)  (.168)  (.146) 
Bureaucratic  Quality  .409*  .476*  .621*  .447*  .38 
(.142)  (.153)  (.170)  (.150) 
Democracy  -.0011 
(.008) 
Openness  .051 
(.301) 
Exchange  Rate Flexibility  -.123 
(.284) 
Use of Fund Credits  .742*  1.126*  .676*  .16 
(.355)  (.399)  (.341) 
Average Balance of  - .098*  -.096*  -.131*  -.091*  -.32 
Payments/GDP  (.034)  (.032)  (.047)  (0.30) 
Terms of Trade  Volatility  .609*  .642*  .662*  .660*  .28 
(.257)  (.266)  (.302)  (.265) 
World  Interest  Rate Shocks  - .177*  -.208*  -.221 *  -.205*  -.30 
(non-OECD  countries)  (0.57)  (.061)  (.065)  (.060) 
No. of cases  691  646  607  691 
p  >X2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Log-likelihood  -155.95  -151.76  -127.65  -154.02 
Pseudo-R2  .623  .618  .654  .628 
Note:  The  dependent  variable  is current  account  restrictions.  The  range  of  analysis  is Article  VIII  countries  only,  1982-95.  The  results  are  for a  logit  model 
with  correction  for  time  dependence  of  observations  coefficients  (robust  standard  errors).  Three  cubic  splines  were  included  but  not  reported  here.  For 
model  4,  A prob  refers  to  the  effect  on  the  predicted  probability  of  a  restriction  of  an  increase  of  two  standard  deviations  in the  variable's  value  (centered 
on  its  mean),  with  all other  variables  held  at  their  means,  with  the  exception  of  use  of  fund  credits  and  the  cubic  splines,  which  are  held  at  0.  For  use  of 
fund  credits,  Aprob  is  calculated  moving  from  0  to  1.  *p  >  IZI =  .05. 
interesting is the apparent strength of external behav- 
ior as an influence on the commitment decision, even 
when  controlling  for  economic  conditions  to  which 
governments obviously feel pressures to respond. This 
seems to suggest that "peer pressure" in a competitive 
market context,  rather than  either  IMF  pressure  or 
economic  conditions  alone,  are  in  part  driving the 
willingness of  governments to  make  a legal  commit- 
ment to a liberal international monetary policy. 
Why Comply  with  an Article  VilI 
Commitment? 
Members of the IMF are legally required to fulfill their 
commitment  to  keep  the  current account  free  from 
restrictions  and  to  maintain  unified  exchange  rates. 
Although  38 members have a perfect record on both 
volatility were also analyzed. The results were insignificant and are 
not reported here. 
counts,17  the  same  cannot  be  said for  the  countries 
listed in Table 2. Most of the long-term noncompliers 
are concentrated in Latin America, despite the marked 
trend toward liberalization in this region  during the 
mid-to-late  1990s.  The  global  financial  crisis  of 
1996-97  elicited  foreign  exchange  restrictions  in  a 
number of Article  VIII  countries that otherwise had 
exemplary records (e.g., Singapore and Korea). 
What  explains  the  variance  in  compliance  among 
countries  that  have  chosen  openness?  This  section 
focuses  only  on  cases  in  which  governments  have 
17 As  of  1997:  Armenia,  Bahrain,  Canada,  Denmark,  Djibouti, 
Estonia, Finland, Gambia, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Kiribati, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mau- 
ritius, Micronesia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Por- 
tugal, Qatar, Russia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles,  Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab 
Emirates,  United  States,  Vanuatu,  and  Yemen  Arab  Republic. 
There  are very few yearly observations on  several of  these  cases, 
however. 
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committed  to  Article  VIII  and  then  implemented 
restrictions on the current account.'8 The most obvious 
explanation is economic pressure that makes the main- 
tenance  of  an open  current account  and unified ex- 
change  rates very difficult. Certainly, that  is  a likely 
factor  in  Latin America  in  the  1980s  and  in  Asian 
countries  in  recent  years.  In  the  tests  that  follow  I 
present  results  that  control  for Average Balance  of 
Payments/GDP, Terms of  Trade Volatility, and  World 
Interest  Rate Shocks. These are chosen not only because 
they  can  have  a  substantial effect  on  the  ability of 
governments  to  maintain  a  current account  free  of 
restrictions, but  also  because  they  are  unmistakably 
exogenous  to  a government's policy at any particular 
time. 
My central concern is the pressure that the behavior 
of  other  similarly situated  countries  places  on  the 
decision  to  comply.  Investors  and  suppliers  should 
prefer to do business in countries whose  legal frame- 
work protects international contracts. In Table 3, Re- 
gional  Noncompliance  reflects  the  extent  to  which 
countries within the  same  region  have  implemented 
restrictions on current accounts. On the one hand, the 
expectation  is  that  if  Article  VIII  countries  in  the 
region often  disregarded their commitment, then the 
probability increases that any given country in that area 
will not comply. On the other hand, the more compet- 
itors are willing to comply, the greater is the pressure 
for  any one  country to  comply, even  in  the  face  of 
conditions that favor protecting the national economy 
through restrictions. 
The institutional context also may be important for 
the compliance question. First, if the IMF is "enforc- 
ing" liberal legal  obligations through the  conditional 
distribution of  resources, then  one  would  expect  the 
use of these credits to be associated at the margin (i.e., 
controlling for economic conditions) with compliance. 
Second, compliance may be more palatable if it is not 
essential to maintain reserves to defend a fixed value of 
the currency. Flexible rates should be associated with 
greater compliance. 
Finally, it is important to consider characteristics of 
the  domestic  polity itself.  Several authors imply that 
compliance  with  international  legal  commitments  is 
much more prevalent among liberal democracies, due 
to  the  constraining  influence  exercised  by  domestic 
groups with an interest in or a preference for compliant 
behavior  (Schachter  1991,  7;  Young  1979; see  also 
Moravcsik 1997). In this view participatory politics may 
pressure the government, especially if noncompliance 
curtails the  rights of  residents  to  foreign  exchange. 
Others argue that the most important characteristic of 
liberal democracy in terms of international compliance 
is a strong domestic  commitment to  the  rule of  law. 
The many variants of this argument range from that of 
Slaughter (1995), who maintains that independent ju- 
diciaries in liberal democracies seem to share some of 
18 This  is  presented  as  a priori evidence  of  noncompliance,  even 
though  at  this  point  I  do  not  examine  the  technical  question  as  to 
whether the IME Executive Board approved the restrictions in place, 
rendering them "legal" temporarily. 
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the  same  substantive  approaches  to  law, to  a  more 
general  contention  that  domestic  systems that value 
rule-based decision making and dispute resolution are 
also  more  likely to  respect  rules internationally.'9 In 
essence, these are affinity arguments: Domestic  norms 
regarding limited government, respect for judicial pro- 
cesses, and regard for constitutional constraints "carry 
over"  into  the  realm  of  international  politics.20  They 
rest on an intuitively appealing assumption that poli- 
cymakers and lawmakers are not  able  to  park their 
normative  perspectives  at  the  water's  edge  (Risse- 
Kappen 1995). 
There are other reasons to expect the rule of law to 
be  associated with Article  VIII  compliance.  Rule-of- 
law  countries  have  a  strong  positive  reputation  for 
maintaining  a  stable  framework for  property rights. 
Markets expect them to keep their commitments, and 
to  undermine  this  expectation  would  prove  costly. 
Countries that score low with respect to the rule of law 
do  not  have much to  lose  by noncompliance;  erratic 
behavior is hardly surprising to investors and traders. I 
use  an indicator that is especially appropriate to  test 
the market's assessment of the reputation for rule of 
law:  a  six-point  scale  published  by  a  political  risk 
analysis firm expressly to assess the security of invest- 
ments  (see  Knack and Keefer  1995, 225).  The  scale 
measures the willingness of citizens peacefully to  im- 
plement law and adjudicate disputes using established 
institutions. Higher  scores  indicate  such institutional 
characteristics as a strong court system, sound political 
institutions, and provisions for orderly succession. Low 
scores reflect extralegal activities in response to conflict 
and to settle disputes. 
Because  I  have  argued that  compliance  is  market 
enforced and that markets prefer certainty in the legal 
framework, the comparison between the participatory 
characteristics of  democracy and rule-of-law regimes 
should  be  especially  telling.  There  is  no  reason  to 
expect that democracy alone provides the stability that 
economic  agents -desire; on the contrary, popular par- 
ticipation along with weak guarantees for fair enforce- 
ment of property rights can endanger these rights. It is 
true  that  the  two variables  are positively  correlated 
(Pearson  =  .265), but they are certainly conceptually 
distinct  and  may  have  very  different  effects  on  the 
decision  to  comply with Article  VIII.  In particular, I 
directly compare  two  regime  characteristics that  are 
often  conflated:  the  participatory dimensions  of De- 
mocracy and the  procedural emphasis of  the  rule of 
law. A  measure  for Bureaucratic Competence is  also 
included to control for the differential capacity of states 
to intervene in foreign exchange markets. 
In this case the compliance decision is modeled using 
a  logistical  regression  (logit)  model;  the  dependent 
19 This  captures  the  flavor  of  some  of  the  democratic  peace  litera- 
ture,  such  as  Doyle  (1986),  Dixon  (1993),  and  Raymond  (1994). 
20  "International  law  is  not  unlike  constitutional  law  in  that  it 
imposes  legal  obligations  upon  a  government  that  in  theory  the 
government  is  not  free  to  ignore  or  change"  (Fisher  1981,  30). 
Constitutional  constraints  most  often  rest  on  their  shared  normative 
acceptance  rather  than  on  the  certainty  of  their  physical  enforce- 
ment,  which  is  another  possible  parallel  to  the  international  setting. American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 4 
variable has a value  of  1 for the presence  of  restric- 
tions, 0 for their absence.  (Since I am analyzing only 
Article VIII countries, restrictions constitute noncom- 
pliance.)  Because  the  data  consist  of  observations 
across countries and over time, with a strong probabil- 
ity of temporal dependence among observations, a logit 
specification is used that takes explicit account of the 
nonindependence  of  observations  (Beck,  Katz,  and 
Tucker 1998).21  The results are reported in Table 3. 
One  of  the  most  important findings is,  again, the 
clustering of compliance behavior across regions. Arti- 
cle VIII countries are much more likely to put illegal 
restrictions on  current accounts if other countries in 
the region are doing so. Can this be  due to common 
economic  pressures  in  the  region?  That  possibility 
cannot be ruled out completely, but it is rendered less 
likely by the range of economic variables included in 
the  specification.  Various  measures  of  the  current 
account, trade volatility, and interest rate shocks failed 
to wash out apparent regional mimickry. Three other 
economic variables (GNP per capita, change in GDP, 
and reserves as a proportion of GDP) were included in 
the analysis but are not reported here, since they were 
not statistically significant and did not affect the results 
reported above. Compliance decisions are apparently 
not being made on the basis of  economic  conditions 
alone but with an eye to standards of regional behavior. 
The most obvious reason would be reputational conse- 
quences  in  a competitive  international economy.  In- 
deed,  one  possible  indication  of  the  importance  of 
reputational pressures may be found in the influence of 
world  interest  rates. As  these  increase  (indicating a 
more competitive global environment for capital), non- 
OECD  governments  were  much  less  likely,  ceteris 
paribus, to violate Article VIII commitments, despite 
the fact that higher rates are likely to increase balance- 
of-payments pressures. 
The  domestic  political variables tell  an interesting 
story with respect to regime characteristics. First, the 
evidence is strong that states must have the bureaucratic 
capacity to renege on their commitments. The strong 
positive relationship between bureaucratic quality and 
restrictions implies that these choices are more likely to 
be made when the capacity exists to implement them. 
Second,  trade dependence  has virtually no  effect  on 
these results. Third, in contrast with theories of interna- 
tional behavior that concentrate on the law-conscious- 
ness  of  democracies, the  evidence  here  suggests that 
democracy  contributes  little  or  nothing  when  other 
factors are held constant,22  but a strong domestic com- 
21  This solution takes advantage of the fact that annual time-series 
cross-sectional  data  with  a  dichotomous  dependent  variable  are 
equivalent to grouped duration data. To take explicit account of the 
temporal grouping of the dependent variable, a counter vector was 
created, such that t = 0 if a restriction is in place or if a country is in 
the first year of current account liberalization. Successive years of no 
restrictions are coded  1, 2,...,  n for each year beyond year one. 
Three  cubic  splines  were  then  calculated  based  on  this  count 
according to a routine made available on Richard Tucker's website 
(http:  //  www.fas.harvard.edu/-rtucker/papers/grouped/grouped3. 
html). The cubic splines were included as explanatory variables, but 
their coefficients are not reported here. The splines are important as 
a corrective for assuming that observations are time-independent in 
this time-series cross-sectional logit framework. 
22  For a subset of countries that were IMF members by 1980, earlier 
mitment  to  the  rule  of  law contributes positively to 
compliance. In fact, a move from one standard devia- 
tion below to one standard deviation above the mean 
on the rule-of-law scale (from 2.3 to 5.7 on the six-point 
scale) reduces the probability of noncompliance by .45, 
according to model 4, holding other variables constant. 
If the  IMF enforced  compliance, we  might expect 
borrowing from  the  fund  to  have  a  strong negative 
effect on the dependent variable. Yet, the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant. The fund is toler- 
ating a good deal of noncompliance when it comes to 
restricting access to foreign exchange23 a finding that is 
inconsistent with the successful use of leverage. 
To Commit  or Not to  Commit:  What  Is the 
Difference? 
I now consider whether the law matters. Specifically, 
does an Article VIII commitment have an independent 
effect  on  behavior,  once  we  take  into  account  the 
obvious  economic  factors  that  are  likely  to  lead  to 
restrictions? 
In order to answer this question, I examine the entire 
data  set  (133  countries,  including  Article  VIII  and 
Article XIV cases, with observations over time averag- 
ing 20 years) using logit  analysis to  explain the  exis- 
tence  of  restrictions.24 Article  VIII  commitment  is 
forced  to  compete  with  a broad  range  of  economic 
conditions that clearly are associated with restrictions: 
volatility  in  the  terms  of  trade,  reserves,  and  the 
balance of payments; poor economic growth rates; and 
low GNP per capita.25 
Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. Most of 
the economic variables have the expected effects, and 
many are significant. Strong influences are associated 
with terms of trade volatility and business cycles (both 
clearly exogenous  to  the  decision  to  restrict current 
accounts), balance-of-payment difficulties (reasonably 
exogenous), and low reserves. But because reserves may 
be  endogenous to  the  decision to  restrict the  current 
account, they are not included in model 1, the reduced 
form exogenous version. As seen in earlier analysis of 
the Article VIII countries alone, trade openness is al- 
research  shows  a  negative  correlation  between  democracy  and 
compliance with respect  to  restrictions on  current accounts  (Sim- 
mons 2000). 
23  This  is completely  consistent  with  archival research, which has 
uncovered evidence that stand-by arrangements are often accompa- 
nied by the temporary approval of restrictions in order to conserve 
foreign exchange. 
24  The same technique for time-dependence  of observations is used 
as described above. 
25  The  previous  analysis suggests  that Article  VIII  status  itself  is 
endogenous,  but  this  endogeneity  is  not  taken  into  consideration 
here. First, it is not obvious how to go about creating an instrument 
for  Article  VIII,  given  the  structure of  the  data  and  the  events 
analysis in the first phase of  the argument. Second,  a case can be 
made  that  one  should  avoid  instruments  in  cases  in  which  the 
instrument does  not  correlate very strongly with  the  endogenous 
variable  (Bound,  Jaeger,  and  Baker  1995).  Third, an  anonymous 
reviewer suggests  that the  observable variables in  the  compliance 
model are very likely to control for nonrandom selection into Article 
VIII status. For a discussion of controlling for selection  on observ- 
ables, see Heckman and Robb 1985, 190-1. 
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TABLE 4.  Restrictions  on  Current Account:  Does  Article  Vil  Commitment  Matter? 
Model 3 
Explanatory  Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Coef.  Aprob. 
Constant  -.699  .680*  .598* 
(.413)  (.331)  (.355) 
Article  Vill  Commitment  -.903*  -1.101*  -1.111*  -.18 
(.136)  (.135)  (.130) 
Regional  Restrictions  4.00* 
(.395) 
Terms of Trade  Volatility  337*  . 417*  .403*  .18 
(.099)  (.095)  (.094) 
Balance of Payments/GDP  -.016*  -.022*  -019*  -.09 
(.008)  (.008)  (.007) 
GNP/Capita  .00004 
(.00002) 
Reservers/GDP  1.43*  .957*  .05 
(.526)  (.353) 
Change in GDP  -.032*  -.026*  -.027*  -.14 
(.013)  (.012)  (.011) 
Openness  -  .002  -  .003 
(.001)  (.002) 
Use of Fund  Credits  .826*  .880*  .34 
(.132)  (.131) 
Flexible  Exchange Rates  .146 
(.156) 
Years since Last  - 1.226*  - 1.272*  - 1.26*  -.38 
Restriction  (.108)  (.111)  (.109) 
No. of cases  3,053  3,060  3,100 
p  >x2  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Log-likelihood  -751.75  -805.39  -819.89 
Pseudo-R2  .64  .62  .62 
Note: The results of a time-series  cross-section  logit model are reported; the dependent  variable is restrictions on current accounts;  coefficients  are robust 
standard  errors. Three cubic  splines  were  included  but not reported  here.  For model  3,  A prob refers to the  effect  on the  predicted  probability of a 
restriction of an increase  of two standard deviations  in the variable's value (centered  on its mean), with all other variables  held at their means,  with the 
exception  of use of fund credits, years since  last restriction, and the cubic spines,  which are held at 0. For use of fund credits, Aprob is calculated  moving 
from 0 to  1. For years  since  last restriction, Aprob is calculated  moving from 1 to 5. *p >  IZI =  .05. 
so  likely to  be  associated  with  liberal policy  choice, 
although certainty does not quite reach standard levels 
of significance (p <.10).  Another interesting finding is 
that use of fund credits is consistently strongly associ- 
ated with illiberal policy choice, which again provides 
evidence  that  these  choices  cannot  convincingly be 
explained by fund pressure in the context of extending 
loans. 
Most  important for my purposes, however, is that 
controlling for  every likely macroeconomic  influence 
on the decision to implement current account restric- 
tions, a formal declaration of adherence to Article VIII 
obligations consistently has a strong negative effect on 
the  probability of  imposing restrictions. In fact, con- 
trolling for all other economic variables as well as for 
policy inertia,26 countries that continue  to  live under 
26  Here I report the predicted probabilities as generated by a set of 
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the transitional Article XIV regime have an estimated 
probability of  .87, according to  Table  4, model  3, of 
implementing restrictions; the corresponding probabil- 
ity for an identically situated Article  VIII  country is 
only .69. Thus, commitment accounts for a percentage 
point  difference  of  about  18  in  the  probability  of 
imposing restrictions on current accounts for the sam- 
simulation  algorithms developed  by King, Tomz,  and  Wittenberg 
(1998). These routines have the advantage of producing confidence 
intervals that take into account the uncertainty surrounding the logit 
parameters. Conventional methods for calculating probabilities from 
logit regression assume that the parameter estimates  are perfectly 
estimated and, therefore, do not allow us to report adequately the 
uncertainty surrounding the probabilities. The simulation algorithms 
of King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, however, generate a full distribution 
of parameter estimates that can then be converted to probabilities, a 
mean can be calculated, and meaningful confidence intervals can be 
drawn. American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 4 
FIGURE 3.  The  Marginal  Effect  of an Article  Vil  Commitment  on  Current Account  Restriction, 
Various  Intervals  from  Last  Restriction 
Mean marginal effect 
95% confidence  interval, lower bounds 
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Note: The figure presents  simulated  effects  using results from Table 4,  Model 3. 
ple of cases as a whole. Even when we control for the 
policies  of  other  countries  in  the  region,  the  legal 
commitment  continues  to  matter  greatly  (model  1). 
Clearly, neither economic  conditions nor imitative be- 
havior alone can fully account for the decision to eschew 
restrictions. The legal commitment itself is an important 
part of the story. 
Interestingly, the  effect  of  the  legal  commitment  is 
distributed unevenly over time.27  The marginal effects of 
commitment reported in Table 4 assumed one year had 
elapsed since a country's previous restriction.28  Figure 3 
traces out  the  marginal effects of  commitment  on  the 
probability of restrictions as a function of time since the 
last  restrictions.  It  shows  that  commitment  has  the 
greatest effect in the first two or three years after lifting 
restrictions. Two years after a restriction, the marginal 
effect of commitment peaks at about .27, which is a truly 
significant effect of a legal commitment on behavior. For 
countries freed from restrictions for the past five years 
(76 cases), the probability of instituting them is .035 with 
an  Article  VIII  commitment  and  .058 without,  for  a 
27  I have interacted Article VIII with years since last restriction and 
calendar years and have run analyses in both OLS and logit to see if the 
results are robust. Nothing changes substantially regarding the impor- 
tance of making an Article VIII commitment. Additional  analysis is 
available from the author upon request. 
28  Denoted as t = 0 for purposes of the counting vector upon which the 
cublic splines are calculated (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). 
marginal effect  of  about  .023.  There  is  virtually no 
independent influence on the legal commitment once a 
country is six years away from its last restriction. 
This suggests that the legal commitment is crucial to 
policy choice in the first few fragile years of liberaliza- 
tion. That is likely to be a period in which the economy 
is not yet fully stabilized, and the bureaucratic capacity 
to  intervene  may still be  available. These  conditions 
provide a severe test of the commitment to maintain 
liberalization. Governments in Article VIII  countries 
need  to convince markets that they are serious about 
coming back into compliance  in order to  regain lost 
credibility. Article XIV countries have much less cred- 
ibility in the first place. In the absence of reputational 
effects, there is little evidence that they strive as hard to 
retain any liberalization they are temporarily able to 
achieve. 
It is not at all surprising that this initial effect should 
deteriorate over time. The longer a country is free from 
restrictions, the less likely it is to reimplement them. 
Over  time  the  bureaucratic capacity to  intervene  is 
dismantled. Groups advantaged by the policy are likely 
to adjust their "portfolios" to the liberalized environ- 
ment  as time  passes. This is not  to  say that a shock 
would not cause relapse; rather, policy inertia is real, 
and we should expect it to have a marked influence on 
outcomes. But this only serves to underscore the effects 
of the international legal commitment to keep current 
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accounts free from restrictions. This commitment is a 
significant factor  in whether  a  liberal  inertia  has  a 
chance to take hold. 
These  findings provide fairly strong evidence  that 
legal  commitment  has  a  systematic  effect  on  state 
behavior. It should be underscored that it was shown to 
affect the propensity to restrict current accounts after 
controlling for a wide  range of  economic  conditions, 
the policies  of other countries in the region, and the 
time dependence  of observations (policy inertia). It is 
not  easy to  counter that these  results are merely an 
endogenous  reflection of the actions governments in- 
tended  to  take  regardless of  a  formal  commitment. 
Recall  that  adherence  to  Article  VIII  is  a  one-way 
commitment, and in the thirty to fifty years afterward 
there are certainly likely to be unanticipated occasions 
on  which eschewing restrictions on  current accounts 
proves inconvenient. Nonetheless, in a significant num- 
ber of such cases, governments apparently decided that 
their best interests lay in abiding by their commitment 
to refrain from restrictive policies. 
CONCLUSION 
The effect of international law on state behavior should 
be a central concern of international relations scholar- 
ship, but few studies have systematically examined this 
issue.  International  legal  scholars  tend  to  view  law 
compliance  as  the  norm  (Chayes  and  Chayes  1993; 
Henkin  1979),  but  political  scientists  are  far  more 
skeptical  (Downs,  Rocke,  and  Barsoom  1996; 
Mearsheimer 1994-95).  In the face  of  daunting con- 
ceptual  and  methodological  issues  (Simmons  1998), 
very little  evidence  has  been  accumulated to  assess 
basic propositions about why governments commit to 
and comply with international legal  obligations,  and 
whether  this  makes  any  difference  to  outcomes  in 
which we are interested. 
The  legalization  of  some  central  aspects  of  the 
international  monetary  regime  after  World  War  II 
provides an opportunity to inquire into the conditions 
under which law can influence the behavior of govern- 
ments in their choice  of  international monetary poli- 
cies. In this issue area, we can be fairly precise about 
what constitutes obligation and compliance, using the 
IMF's own data. My strategy has been  to  model  the 
factors  that  contribute  to  the  rate  of  Article  VIII 
acceptance, test a set of propositions regarding com- 
pliance with this commitment, and assess the effect of 
that commitment on behavior. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  findings  is  that  the 
behavior of  other  countries,  especially  in  one's  own 
region,  has  far more  influence  on  commitment  and 
compliance  than  has  generally been  recognized.  In- 
deed,  there  is  more  evidence  of  competitive  policy 
convergence than of overt pressure from the IMF on 
borrowing countries. Especially intriguing is the finding 
that  governments  are  positively  influenced  by  the 
choices of others in their region. They are more likely 
to make  and to honor  a legal  commitment  if neighbors 
are doing so. This provides evidence that norms are set 
and reputations are assessed among groups of roughly 
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comparable  countries,  likely  through  international 
markets rather than  international  organizations. Al- 
though the IMF undoubtedly has significant influence 
on some countries at certain times, much more decen- 
tralized forces seem largely to be at play. 
Among Article VIII countries, two domestic regime 
effects have clear consequences  for compliance.  Sur- 
prisingly for those who view the international behavior 
of democracies as somehow distinctive with respect to 
law and obligation, participatory democracy has little 
to  do  with the  compliance  issue.  Regimes  based  on 
clear principles of the rule of law are far more likely to 
comply with  their  commitments.  This  indicates  that 
rules and popular pressures can and apparently some- 
times do have distinct consequences when it comes to 
international  law  compliance.  Apparently,  govern- 
ments  that  provide  a  stable  framework of  law  and 
system of property rights domestically are more likely 
to do the same for international economic transactions. 
One interpretation is that a credible commitment to a 
stable system of law is not divisible in the eye of the 
investor.  A  rule-of-law  government  may  have  even 
more to lose from noncompliance with an international 
legal obligation than a more capricious regime. 
Perhaps no question has plagued scholars of inter- 
national institutions as persistently as the challenge to 
demonstrate that such institutions have a direct effect 
on state behavior. Does  international law order state 
action? How can we know that governments have not 
simply committed  to  do things that they would  have 
done even in the absence of rules? How can we be sure 
that the  rules  are not  epiphenomenal  rather than  a 
constraint on future behavior? "Proof" of such propo- 
sitions may not be possible, but the evidence presented 
here  addresses such skepticism. Once we  control for 
most of the obvious reasons a government may choose 
to restrict its current account, Article VIII status still 
emerges as a truly significant influence on the proba- 
bility of choosing to restrict. An Article VIII country 
facing external economic pressures and business cycle 
conditions matching those of a similarly situated Arti- 
cle XIV  country manages much more often  to  avoid 
implementing restrictions to cope with these pressures, 
even if other countries in the region decide to restrict. 
This is not simply due to IMF pressure attached to 
credits, and it is not  an artifact of the  exchange rate 
regime. A look at the timing of the estimated effect of 
commitment  reveals  something  of  the  law's  impor- 
tance: Significant influence is concentrated in the first 
few fragile years after a restriction is lifted. Countries 
that have failed  to  live up to  their obligations  seem 
especially  determined  to  reestablish their credibility. 
Law  seems  to  matter  at  a  defining  moment:  Legal 
commitments  can push  a  country onto  a behavioral 
trajectory of compliance from which it is decreasingly 
likely  to  deviate.  We  should  continue  to  entertain 
alternative explanations, but these tests indicate that a 
legal commitment may carry decisive weight in deter- 
mining some states' international monetary policy. 
This article challenges researchers to design projects 
that will better  expose  the mechanisms that enhance 
international  law  compliance.  Does  formal  commit- American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 4 
ment  trigger  greater  external  reputational  conse- 
quences associated with noncompliance than does the 
same policy in the absence of a commitment? Does  a 
legal commitment have consequences in domestic pol- 
itics that effectively constrain governmental behavior? 
Does  decentralized "enforcement," whether domestic 
or international, explain patterns of  compliance with 
other  sets  of  rules  to  which  sovereign  governments 
commit? The answers that eventually emerge will have 
profound implications for both the theory and practice 
of international relations. 
APPENDIX 
Dependent  Variables 
Article  VIII  Commitment.  The  variable  is  scored  1  if  a 
country  has  accepted  Article  VIII  status,  0  if  it  remains 
subject  to Article  XIV  transitional  arrangements.  Acceptance 
indicates  the  end  of  a  "spell"  for  purposes  of  the  Cox 
proportional  hazard  model.  Source:  IMF  various  years. 
Restriction.  Restrictions  on  payments  in  current  account; 
scored  1 if  restrictions  exist;  0  otherwise.  When  this  depen- 
dent  variable  is used  only  to  analyze  policies  of  Article  VIII 
countries,  it  is  interpreted  as  noncompliance.  Source:  IMF 
various  years. 
Explanatory  Variables 
Universality.  This  refers  to  the  proportion  of  current  IMF 
members,  calculated  yearly,  who  have  accepted  Article  VIII 
status.  Source:  IMF  various  years. 
Regional  Norm.  This  refers  to  the  proportion  of  current 
IMF  members  within  each  region  who  have  accepted  Article 
VIII  status.  Classification  of  economies  by region  (East  and 
southern  Africa;  West  Africa;  East  Asia  and  Pacific;  Eastern 
Europe  and Central  Asia;  rest of Europe;  Middle  East;  North 
Africa;  Americas)  are  based  on  World  Bank  categories. 
Source:  IMF  various  years. 
Surveillance.  This  dummy  variable  indicates  whether  the 
period  up  to  and  including  (0)  or  after  (1)  1977,  when  a 
comprehensive  regime  of  IMF  surveillance  was  instituted  for 
all  members,  whether  Article  XIV  or Article  VIII  status. 
Use of Fund  Credit.  The  variable  is scored  1 if a country  has 
made  use  of  IMF  credits  during  a  given  year,  0  otherwise. 
Source:  World  Bank  1995. 
Exchange  Rate Flexibility.  This  variable  indicates  the  extent 
to which  exchange  rates  are flexible  (1) versus  fixed  (0).  If the 
IMF  describes  a  country's  exchange  rate  as  "par  value 
applied"  or  a  "unitary  effective  ...  fixed  rate"  (1966-73),  I 
code  the  case  fixed;  otherwise  it is coded  flexible.  If the  IMF 
describes  a country's  exchange  rate  as "not maintained  within 
relatively  narrow  margins"  (1974-82),  I  code  it  flexible, 
otherwise  it  is  coded  fixed.  If the  IMF  describes  a country's 
exchange  rate  regime  as  a  "more  flexible  arrangement" 
(1983-98),  I  code  it  flexible,  otherwise  fixed.  Source:  IMF 
various  years. 
Openness.  The  measure  is imports  (total  value  of goods  and 
services:  sum  of  merchandise  f.o.b.,  imports  of  nonfactor 
services,  and factor  payments  at market  prices  in current  U.S. 
dollars)  plus  exports  (total  value  of  goods  and  services;  sum 
of  merchandise  f.o.b., exports of  nonfactor services, and 
factor receipts  at market  prices in current  U.S. dollars  as a 
proportion  of GDP. Source:  World  Bank 1995. 
Democracy.  The  score  (ranging  from  a low  of  0 to  a high  of 
10)  denotes  the  degree  of democratic  institutions  within  each 
country.  Scores  are  derived  from  "subjective  codings  of  the 
competitiveness  of  political  participation,  the  openness  and 
competitiveness  of  executive  recruitment,  and  the  level  of 
constraints  on  the  chief  executive"  (Jaggers  and  Gurr  1995, 
411).  Source:  Jaggers  and  Gurr  1996. 
Balance  of Payments/GDP.  The  measure  is  the  current  ac- 
count  balance  (the  sum  of net  exports  of goods  and nonfactor 
services,  net  factor  income,  and  net  private  transfers  as  a 
percentage  of  GPD,  before  official  transfers)  as a proportion 
of  GDP  for  each  country  for  the  period  under  observation. 
Source:  World  Bank  1995. 
Current Account  Volatility.  This  is  the  log  of  the  standard 
deviation  of current  account  balance  as a proportion  of  GDP 
(defined  above).  Source:  World  Bank  1995. 
Reserves/GDP.  The  measure  is  central  monetary  authority 
foreign  exchange  reserves  (including  official  holdings  of  gold 
valued  at  London  market  prices,  SDR  holdings,  reserve 
position  at the  IMF)  in current  U.S.  dollars  as a proportion  of 
GDP.  Source:  World  Bank  1995. 
Average Reserves/GDP.  The  measure  is reserves  as a propor- 
tion  of  GDP  averaged  by  country  for  the  period  under 
observation. 
Reserve Volatility.  This  is the  log  of the  standard  deviation  of 
reserves/GDP.  Source:  World  Bank  1995. 
Terms  of  Trade  Volatility.  This  is  the  log  of  the  standard 
deviation  of  the  terms  of  trade  index,  which  is  the  relative 
level  of export  prices  compared  with  import  prices,  calculated 
as the  ratio  of a country's  index  of average  export  price  to the 
average  import  price  (1987  =  100).  Source:  World  Bank  1995. 
World Interest Rate Shock.  The  measure  is U.S.  Treasury  bill 
rates,  annual  average,  interacted  with  non-OECD  countries. 
Source:  IMF  1999. 
GDP  Growth.  The  GDP  average  annual  growth  rate  is 
calculated  for  the  sum  of  GDP  at  factor  cost  and  indirect 
taxes,  less  subsidies.  Source:  World  Bank  1995. 
Regional  Noncompliance.  This  variable  is  the  proportion, 
calculated  yearly,  of  'current  IMF  members  within  each 
region  who  have  committed  to  Article  VIII  but  who  place 
restrictions  on  current  accounts.  For  classification  by region, 
see  regional  norms  above.  This  explanatory  variable  is used 
only  to  analyze  policies  of  Article  VIII  countries,  and  is 
interpreted  as noncompliance.  Source:  IMF  various  years. 
Rule  of  Law.  The  measure  is  a  six-point  scale  that  deter- 
mines  where  a country's  domestic  polity  falls  regarding  high 
(6)  or  low  (0)  respect  for  the  rule  of  law.  This  variable 
"reflects  the  degree  to which  citizens  of  a country  are willing 
to  accept  the  established  institutions  to make  and  implement 
laws  and  adjudicate  disputes."  Higher  scores  indicate  "sound 
political  institutions,  a strong  court  system,  and provisions  for 
an  orderly  succession  of  power."  Lower  scores  indicate  "a 
tradition  of  depending  on  physical  force  or  illegal  means  to 
settle  claims."  Upon  changes  in  government  in  countries 
scoring  low  on  this  measure,  new  leaders  may  be  "less  likely 
to  accept  the  obligations  of the  previous  regime"  (Knack  and 
Keefer  1995,  225).  Source:  International  Country Risk  Guide 
2000. 
Bureaucratic  Quality.  A  six-point  scale  measures  the  extent 
to  which  a  country's bureaucracy is  very  capable  (6)  or 
incapable (0) of carrying out a range of administrative tasks. 
For a full discussion of the conceptualization of this variable, 
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see  Knack and Keefer (1995). Source: International Country 
Risk Guide 2000. 
Years  since Last Restriction.  A vector was created using the 
STATA routine made available on Richard Tucker's website 
(http://vww.fas.harvard.edu/-rtucker/papers/grouped/grouped3. 
html). This is coded 0 if the country  restricts  or is in the first  year 
of lifting a restriction;  otherwise,  the years of no restrictions  are 
counted. 
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